University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

2014

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment
Sam kamin
Justin F. Marceau

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2014

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment
Publication Statement
Copyright held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This paper is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/23

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-3\MIA305.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

2-MAY-14

13:09

University of Miami Law Review
VOLUME 68

SPRING 2014

NUMBER 3

ARTICLES
Double Reasonableness and the
Fourth Amendment
SAM KAMIN* & JUSTIN MARCEAU**
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FROM WARRANTS TO REASONABLENESS . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Early Years of the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s Use of
Presumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. THE INSCRUTABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. THE WARRANT AND PROBABLE CAUSE PRESUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. The Presumption in Favor of Warrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. The Probable Cause Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. RETREAT FROM THE PRESUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Spread of Reasonableness Across the Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . .
1. INVESTIGATIVE STOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. CONSENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY: FROM AUTOMATIC TO UNLIKELY . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. A Blanket Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. A Familiar Tale: From Rule to Presumption to Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM WITH DOUBLE REASONABLENESS . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Conflating Rights and Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Reasonable Distortion of Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. REASONABLENESS AS A ONE-WAY RATCHET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. PATH DEPENDENCY: A FOURTH AMENDMENT BORN FROM A ROBUST
EXCLUSIONARY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. A WAY HOME: RETURNING FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE TO CLEAR
RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

590
594

R
R

594
594
596
596
598
600
602
602
604
607
610
611
612
613
618
619
622
622

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

627

R

627
631

R
R

* Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of
Denver, Sturm College of Law. B.A., summa cum laude, Amherst College; J.D., Order of the
Coif, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley.
** Associate Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. B.A., summa cum
laude, Boston College; J.D., cum laude, Harvard University.

589

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643109

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-3\MIA305.txt

590

unknown

Seq: 2

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

2-MAY-14

13:09

[Vol. 68:589

INTRODUCTION
Legal doctrine is replete with reasonableness tests.1 In fact, it is
unlikely that any area of law lacks a reasonableness test at the center of a
core doctrine. The Fourth Amendment is certainly no exception; the textual prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures has led the United
States Supreme Court to conclude that the “ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”2 What makes the Fourth Amendment unique, however, is the relatively recent insistence on not one but
two tiers of reasonableness review in adjudicating Fourth Amendment
claims.3 Both the substance of the right and the availability of a remedy
are currently assessed under overlapping, but distinct, reasonableness
tests.4 Unfortunately, this double reasonableness review does not double
the reasonableness of the ultimate results obtained; instead, it has
something of the opposite effect. Double reasonableness blurs the lines
between right and remedy. Previous scholarship has identified the strong
link—or equilibration5—between constitutional rights and remedies, but
in this Article we go one step further and develop the claim that the
content of the right itself is becoming increasingly obscure.6 The substance of the Fourth Amendment is stuck in a fog of remedial decisions,
and double reasonableness is the chief culprit.7
1. See, e.g., Hisham M. Ramadan, Reconstructing Reasonableness in Criminal Law:
Moderate Jury Instructions Proposal, 29 J. LEGIS. 233, 233 (2003) (“The concept of
reasonableness or ‘reasonable person’ has become one of the cornerstones in criminal law. It was
introduced into the elements of several offenses and defenses. Some jurisdictions define it as an
average, ordinary person who is a representative of the general community, others are silent, and
leave it to the jury to define as they desire.”); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004)
(In tort law, negligence suits require the fact finder to ask, “[W]hat would a ‘reasonable person’
do ‘under the same or similar circumstances.’”).
2. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001) (rejecting a lower court’s analysis
conflating the two levels of reasonableness analysis).
4. E.g., id. (rejecting the notion that the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force claim
and the qualified immunity inquiry are one and the same).
5. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 (1983); Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–99
(1999) (using the term equilibration to describe the symbiotic relationship between rights and
remedies); id. at 880 (explaining that one cannot seek to understand rights as metaphysically
separate and distinct from remedies, but rather one must recognize remedies as the practical
manifestation of the right).
6. As Donald Dripps recognized in 1986, there is considerable value in disentangling
whether a decision is procedural or substantive. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE
L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (distinguishing cases that lose on legal grounds from cases that are merely
irremediable).
7. If one recognizes that the very scope of a right’s existence depends on the development
and scope of the remedy, then perhaps there is room to argue that identifying the line between
right and remedy is of no import. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 858 (describing the right and the
remedy as “inextricably intertwined”). While we accept the general premise of the equilibration
theory—that is, remedies impact rights and vice versa—we do not agree that it is undesirable to
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Neither of the Supreme Court’s two levels of reasonableness analysis is inevitable or mandated by either the text or history of the Fourth
Amendment. In fact, for most of the last half century, substantive Fourth
Amendment law was comprised of strong presumptions and predictable
rules. Only recently has the substance of Fourth Amendment law shifted
away from clear rules toward a reasonableness standard in all contexts.
Likewise, for most of its history the exclusionary rule was viewed as an
automatic remedy for all Fourth Amendment violations. It has been only
in the last decade that this per se rule has given way to a neutered
balancing test. Accordingly, evidence today will be suppressed in a
criminal case only if there is unreasonableness under each inquiry—substantive and remedial.8 It is now possible to speak of that famous conundrum of reasonable unreasonable searches—those searches that are
sufficiently unreasonable that they deprive the defendant of his Fourth
Amendment right, but not so unreasonable that any remedy will be
forthcoming.9
Scholars have examined the shift in the substantive Fourth Amendment from clear rules to a murky reasonableness test,10 and likewise,
the literature has noted the shift from a per se exclusionary rule to an
amorphous remedial standard,11 but the combined impact of these two
changes taken together has not been substantially addressed. Signifiunderstand the differences between the right and the remedial scheme. More specifically, we are
not arguing a position that we understand to be in tension with the rights equilibration thesis. The
recognition that remedies are the way that rights take on their real world form is not inconsistent
with an effort to know whether a particular limit derives from the right or the remedy. See also
David B. Owens, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on Herring v. United
States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2010).
8. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994). We deal primarily with the remedy
sought by defendants in criminal prosecutions—the suppression of illegally seized evidence from
the government’s case in chief. There are obviously overlaps between the availability of a remedy
in a criminal case and in a suit under § 1983. While focusing on suppression, we discuss these
overlaps throughout.
9. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez
Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the
Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 93 n.366 (1991) (“[T]he Leon exception can be
described as applying to reasonable, unreasonable warrant searches.”).
10. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 8, at 1766 (“The door has since been flung wide open, as the
Court has made clear that the bottom-line Fourth Amendment test is whether the government
intrusion is ‘reasonable’ based upon a balancing of the government’s need to engage in the
intrusion against the individual’s privacy interests. This shift in focus from the Warrant Clause to
a generalized reasonableness inquiry, in turn, has changed the nature of Fourth Amendment
dialogue by gradually, but inevitably, fostering an increased deference to the government’s
judgment that the challenged intrusion is needed.”).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Canter, A Fourth Amendment Metamorphosis: How Fourth
Amendment Remedies and Regulations Facilitated the Expansion of the Threshold Inquiry, 95 VA.
L. REV. 155, 156 (2009) (“[T]he anemia of Fourth Amendment remedies enabled and may have
provided some hydraulic pressure toward an expanded Fourth Amendment right.”).
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cantly, it has gone largely unnoticed that current Fourth Amendment law
is the worst of both worlds—it produces a substantive Fourth Amendment corrupted by the fear of a mandatory exclusionary rule that no
longer exists. We elaborate on both of these problems in this Article and
propose a simple, feasible solution.
Our argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, we detail the gradual
erosion of clear substantive rules in the substance of Fourth Amendment
law. Although for decades the Court identified in the text and history of
the Fourth Amendment a strong presumption in favor of warrants supported by probable cause, it has recently treated this presumption as anything but presumptive. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio12 and continuing to
the present, the Court has repeatedly carved exception after exception
into the ostensible warrant requirement. In case after case, context after
context, the Court has weakened the warrant and probable cause presumptions, replacing them over and over again with totality of the circumstances balancing tests.13 Today, the Court rarely even pays lip
service to the notion that the unreasonable search and seizure clause of
the Fourth Amendment is given meaning and substance by the warrant
clause. Some of the most important recent Fourth Amendment decisions
have in common the striking absence of any reliance on the previous
bedrock presumptions of the Fourth Amendment.14
Next, in Part II, we turn to the fundamental, yet largely unacknowledged, revolution that the Roberts Court has wreaked upon the exclusionary rule. We demonstrate that, notwithstanding the Court’s
assertions to the contrary, cost-benefit balancing is a relatively new
innovation in the remedial context, one that threatens to render toothless
the substance of the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule began its
life as a mandate, was weakened by exceptions, and now exists, in the
Court’s words, “as a last resort.” In Part III, we consider the significant
problems associated with the existence of the nested reasonableness tests
described in the previous two sections. In particular, we identify the dis12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. Of course, we are far from the first scholars to notice the death of the Court’s reliance on
the warrant clause to define reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Silas J.
Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV 119 (1989); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment
Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 386 (1988) (“Prior
to Camara, fourth amendment analysis had a relatively high amount of predictability: the Court
presumed that a warrant based on probable cause was required before the police could perform a
search or arrest. The Court’s strong preference for the warrant requirement relegated the
amendment’s reasonableness clause, which bans ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ to a
secondary role.”).
14. Cf. The Honorable Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still
Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116 (2012).
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tortions and confusion in current Fourth Amendment doctrine wrought
by the double reasonableness framework. We also point out that this
confusion and uncertainty have a dramatic and consistent effect on certain constitutional litigants—that is, this confusion and uncertainty dramatically and inevitably favor the government and disfavor those
alleging a constitutional violation.
Finally, in Part IV, we propose a solution. Despite the far-ranging
scholarly critiques of the weakening of the exclusionary rule, we explain
that the recent limits the Court has placed on exclusion could prove to be
a tremendous opportunity rather than a cataclysm.15 Specifically, we
argue that the decline of the exclusionary rule as an automatic remedy
for a Fourth Amendment violation is an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to clear away a substantial amount of underbrush in its substantive
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment rights and remedies have always been linked; when the exclusionary remedy was perceived as absolute, the scope of the Fourth Amendment right was
correspondingly curtailed. Under a system of exclusionary entitlement,
the Court was often rightly concerned that an expansive substantive right
would lead to the exclusion of probative evidence in an enormous number of cases.16 As a result, the Court developed a cramped reading of the
Fourth Amendment that permits vast intrusions by law enforcement into
the privacy of individual citizens in countless contexts and situations.
Now that the Court is determined to use the exclusionary rule more judiciously, by contrast, it has created for itself the opportunity and obligation to revisit some of its most important Fourth Amendment cases to
repair damage done decades earlier.
In our view, the time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog
caused by double reasonableness review. The Court’s exclusionary rule
cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide
the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment
doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an
approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth
Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is
15. We do not argue that, all things being equal, Herring and its progeny were rightly
decided. Rather, our point is simply that given the Court’s clear intention to create a new
exclusionary rule jurisprudence, it should take advantage of the opportunity thus created to revisit
some of the worst substantive Fourth Amendment decisions of the last fifty years.
16. The Court’s case law during this period reflects a preoccupation with avoiding the harm
of letting the guilty go free. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting exclusion
was a means of ameliorating the risk that every time the “constable blunders” the guilty go free);
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 637 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (questioning the
exclusionary rule because of its ability to allow “more and more ‘criminals to go free because the
constable has blundered”’).
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more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited
to egregious violations of clear substantive rules.
I.
A.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FROM WARRANTS
TO REASONABLENESS

The Early Years of the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s
Use of Presumptions
1.

THE INSCRUTABILITY

OF THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment lacks a Marbury v. Madison.17 In many
areas of constitutional law there is a sweeping Marshall-era decision that
continues to frame the modern analysis. As Akhil Amar has explained,
“[W]e still look to Marbury v. Madison; in pondering the puzzle of jurisdiction-stripping, we go back to Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee; in reflecting
on the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers and related issues of federalism, we re-examine McCulloch v. Maryland; in considering vested
property rights, we return to Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College v.
Woodward; and so on.”18 For reasons that have been well documented
by others,19 however, the Marshall Court had little occasion to definitively opine on the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court simply did
not meaningfully begin to interpret the Fourth Amendment until well
into the twentieth century.20 In fact, the Fourth Amendment was not
even incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
17. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1123–24 (1996) (“As a subfield of constitutional law, constitutional criminal
procedure stands as an anomaly. In many other areas of constitutional law, major Marshall Court
opinions stand out and continue to frame debate both in courts and beyond. In thinking about
judicial review and executive power . . . . But no comparable Marshall Court landmarks dot the
plain of constitutional criminal procedure.”) (citations omitted); see also Thomas Y. Davies, What
Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 212 (2005) (“In a very real sense, pretrial constitutional
criminal procedure was essentially nonexistent” in the 19th Century.).
18. Amar, supra note 17, at 1123–24.
19. Nathan D. Haynor, Criminal Law: Fly-By-Night Law Enforcement: The Minnesota
Supreme Court Considers the Fourth Amendment as a Separate and Independent Basis of
Suppression for the Statutorily Invalid Nighttime Search in State v. Jackson, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 652, 658 (2009) (“Not until 1886 did the Supreme Court decide the first important Fourth
Amendment case.”).
20. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699,
1728–29 (“In important respects modern criminal procedure law can be traced back to the 1920s
and 1930s. It was in these . . . decades that the Court, largely as a result of Prohibition, began to
confront the kinds of search-and-seizure issues that have come to constitute such a large part
of criminal procedure law—electronic surveillance, automobile searches, the uses of informants.
More importantly, it was during the interwar period that the Supreme Court first applied the
federal Constitution to overturn state criminal convictions—a pivotal move, because law
enforcement in the United States was and remains chiefly a responsibility of state and local
governments.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-3\MIA305.txt

unknown

Seq: 7

2-MAY-14

2014] DOUBLE REASONABLENESS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

13:09

595

Amendment—and thus did not become applicable to the states—until
1949 when the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado.21
Although the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lacks a
temporal Marbury—insofar as the seminal Fourth Amendment decisions
date mostly from the second half of the twentieth century—its constellation is not without a few fixed stars.22 Katz v. United States23 is in many
ways the Fourth Amendment’s substantive Marbury. From 1967 until
very recently, nearly every seminal Fourth Amendment decision uttered
the required talismanic phrases from Katz v. United States24—including
the core holding that the Fourth Amendment is implicated whenever
government officials intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.25 Simply put, for nearly half a century Katz was the starting point
for all Fourth Amendment analysis.26
In Katz and other seminal Fourth Amendment cases, the Court was
obliged to deal with an inherent tension between the Fourth Amendment’s two principal clauses: the reasonableness clause27 and the
warrant clause.28 The relationship between the two is almost entirely
inscrutable; the text itself simply does little to guide the Court in reading
the two clauses together.29 The Court addressed this ambiguity through
the use of presumptions. In Katz, the Court made it clear that even thoroughly reasonable searches based on individualized suspicion generally
violate the Constitution in the absence of a warrant; the Court identified
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Including phrases like, “reasonable expectation of privacy” and “knowingly exposes to
the public.”
25. See, e.g., id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Katz is a seminal decision insofar as it addresses three key Fourth Amendment questions:
(1) When has a search occurred; (2) What is required in order for a search to be lawful; and (3) If
a search is unlawful, what is the remedy. Id. The question of whether a search has occurred is
increasingly unconcerned with the Katzian reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). The question of
whether a warrant and probable cause are required has been substantially eroded as developed in
the remainder of this section. And the question of whether a remedy is automatic has been
fundamentally altered as discussed in the next section.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
28. Id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”).
29. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
precise relationship between the Amendment’s Warrant Clause and Unreasonableness Clause is
unclear.”).
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in the Constitution a requirement that an impartial judicial officer be
“interposed between citizen and police.”30 Katz thus recognized that,
except in certain limited circumstances, the reasonableness clause was
only satisfied when the state showed that it had procured a warrant supported by probable cause.31 Even in the rare circumstances—principally
exigent circumstances—when the Court was willing to suspend the warrant requirement, it held that searches or seizures were presumptively
unconstitutional in the absence of probable cause.32
2.

THE WARRANT
a.

AND

PROBABLE CAUSE PRESUMPTIONS

The Presumption in Favor of Warrants

In an oft-quoted passage from Katz, the Court explained that
searches “without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few spe30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)).
31. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth Amendment proscribes all
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other
sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable. Even
when government agents may lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of
suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before
examining the contents of such a package.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980)
(“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.’ That
language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to
seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”)
(citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (finding exigent circumstances
rendered warrantless police entry of a home reasonable because the officers observed an
altercation between juveniles and adults in the home, and one of the individuals was badly
injured); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (preventing the defendant from entering
his home for two hours while police obtained a search warrant was reasonable because the officers
believed that the defendant had marijuana hidden under a sofa cushion). The Court upheld the
police seizure because it “involve[d] a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement need, i.e., ‘exigent circumstances.’” Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
(finding reasonable suspicion justifies brief detention of luggage pending further investigation);
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (finding the police acted
reasonably when they entered a home that an armed robber had entered). “The Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Id. at 298.
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cifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”33 To be sure, in
drafting the Fourth Amendment the founders were reacting in large part
against the issuance of general warrants which permitted wide-spread
searches for seditious materials.34 The general warrant was one of the
great scourges from which the Bill of Rights was intended to protect
citizens of the new republic. Notwithstanding the misuse of warrants in
colonial America, however, there is good reason to see the requirement
of prior judicial scrutiny as an important bulwark against the untrammeled discretion of the officer in the field. A warrant provides the citizen with assurance that he is not subject to the whim of the officer in the
field and has not been singled out for personal or impermissible reasons.35 It is a testament to the fact that a neutral third party, trained in
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
34. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 589–90 (“It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches
and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that
motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 510 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general
warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the
colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search
where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws.”); see also The Honorable
M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It
Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 912 (2005) (“The immediate aim of the Fourth Amendment was to
ban general warrants and writs of assistance. To this end the Amendment’s Warrant Clause
requires that a warrant ‘particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.’”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance,
30 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 53, 77–78 (1996):
The general writs and the Parliamentary statutes that underlay them, as many of you
will no doubt recall, authorized customs officers—without probable cause, or
individualized suspicion—to break and enter houses, shops, and “any . . . other
place” in search of uncustomed goods. Such a regime seems offensive on several
counts. First, it provided next to no guidance constraining the discretion of officers,
thus inviting discrimination against government enemies and favoritism towards
friends. Second, it authorized intrusions into houses—the most private buildings
imaginable. Third, the writ of assistance scheme theoretically authorized customs
officers to commandeer—to dragoon, or impress—ordinary passersby to aid them in
their invasions. This “assistance” power added a vague and possibly tyrannical new
layer of bodily intrusion and unchecked discretion into the system. Finally, the
objects of the search—relatively innocent “uncustomed” goods like tea and sugar—
were not nearly so compelling as stolen goods, at least in a town, like colonial
Boston, where customs evasion and tax evasion were practically a way of life,
implicating a good many otherwise law-abiding folk.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2006) (“[N]either the Fourth
Amendment nor Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41” requires the executing officer to
“present the property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting his search.”); Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.10 (1980) (“The inability to serve a warrant on the owner of
the property to be searched does not make the execution of the warrant unlawful.”); see also Groh
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004) (“Quite obviously, in some circumstances—a
surreptitious search by means of a wiretap, for example, or the search of empty or abandoned
premises—it will be impracticable or imprudent for the officers to show the warrant in advance.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-3\MIA305.txt

598

unknown

Seq: 10

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

2-MAY-14

13:09

[Vol. 68:589

the law’s requirements,36 has confirmed the officer’s subjective belief
that there is probable cause to search or seize the defendant.37 As the
Court stated in a pre-Katz decision, “Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a
search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”38
b.

The Probable Cause Requirement

During this period, even when the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement did not apply, it invoked a similarly
absolute, if less protective, rule: the probable cause requirement. That is,
even where the Court concluded that the reasonableness clause did not
require a warrant, it nonetheless required probable cause as an essential
prerequisite to governmental searches and seizures. The most obvious
example is for arrests made in public. While the Court was willing to
dispense with the warrant requirement for these cases, it still required
the officers to demonstrate that they had probable cause to arrest.39
Building on both common law tradition and common sense, the Court
reasoned that requiring an arrest warrant for officers making arrests in
public places was not necessary to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. Probable cause, however, remained in place as an important protection against law-enforcement overreaching.
But this is only the most obvious example. Others abounded. For
example, searches and seizures may be conducted in the absence of a
36. But see Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (holding that a magistrate need
not be a lawyer).
37. See Margaret R. Sweeney, United States v. Woodrum, Beware Taxicab Passengers, Your
Individual Rights Are Being Diminished, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 123,
129 (2002) (“The warrant requirement mandates that police officers submit a signed affidavit to a
neutral judge or magistrate requesting a warrant. The warrant will only be issued upon a showing
of probable cause. The officer’s mere subjective belief that probable cause exists will not be
enough to secure a warrant.”).
38. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent.”) (citations omitted). That same year, in another
case, the Court put the matter even more starkly:
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police. . . . And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true
to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).
39. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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warrant when exigent circumstances are present, but only so long as
probable cause is demonstrated.40 Evidence discovered in plain view can
be seized without a warrant, but only so long as the officer has probable
cause to believe that it is contraband.41 Automobiles may be searched,
even when there is no true exigency exception to the warrant, but only
so long as those searches are conducted with probable cause.42
Underlying all of these decisions is the Court’s acknowledgement
that a formal warrant requirement is often inconsistent with modern
policing. In addition, it was clear to the Court that, even at early common law, there were instances where an officer could make an arrest in
public without a warrant or could seize property that was clearly contraband.43 There are thus both practical and historical considerations that
lend support to a reading of the Fourth Amendment that permits some
searches and seizures to be conducted based on probable cause even in
the absence of a warrant.
By contrast, the textual basis for the probable cause presumption is
considerably less robust than that of the warrant presumption. The probable cause requirement appears only in the warrant clause; it would
seem, therefore, to be relevant only to determining whether a warrant
was properly issued and should have no bearing on the reasonableness
of non-warranted searches. Nonetheless, the probable cause requirement
has emerged as an important part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
40. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (stating that citizens have the general
“right to be free from warrantless searches of [their] home[s] unless the searching officers have
probable cause and there are exigent circumstances”) (emphasis added).
41. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
42. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause
as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. As a general
rule, it has also required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable cause issue and the issuance
of a warrant before a search is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the
police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search. Carroll v. United States
holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped
on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained.”) (citation omitted); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out
without a warrant—must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has
occurred.”) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973)).
43. Amar, supra note 34, at 56 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292)
(“[An officer] may, without warrant, arrest anyone for a breach of the peace, committed in his
view, and carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of felony actually committed, or a
dangerous wounding whereby felony is likely to ensue, he may upon probable suspicion arrest the
felon; and for that purpose is authorized (as upon a justice’s warrant) to break open doors.”). But
see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 639
(1999) (“[T]he recognition of probable cause alone as a justification for a warrantless arrest
marked a drastic departure from the common-law regime familiar to the Framers.”).
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even in those cases in which it was determined that a warrant was not
necessary.
3.

RETREAT

FROM THE

PRESUMPTIONS

The Court’s expression of a warrant requirement was controversial
from the beginning.44 To say that the Constitution expresses a preference
for warrants, Professor Amar and others have argued, is inconsistent not
merely with the text of the Amendment itself but with founding era
experiences and practice.45 The Founders were no fans of warrants and
likely saw them as a pernicious tool, permitting agents of the Crown to
search, unfettered and without consequence.46
Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that as time went on the Court
increasingly distanced itself from the strong warrant presumption of
Katz, instead riddling the presumption with exception after exception. In
2004, Justice Thomas accurately captured the state of Fourth Amendment law: “[O]ur cases stand for the illuminating proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 79 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“If the exception of search without a warrant incidental to a legal arrest is extended beyond the
person and his physical extension, search throughout the house necessarily follows.”). But see
Davies, supra note 43, at 551 (“A number of the historical commentaries on the Fourth
Amendment have either favored or rejected a warrant requirement. However, none have supported
their answer with persuasive historical evidence. If one turns to the historical sources themselves,
the mystery initially deepens: the participants in the historical controversies that stimulated the
framing of the Fourth Amendment simply did not discuss when a warrant was required. Odd as it
may seem, the Framers simply were not troubled by the most salient issue in the modern debate.”).
45. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
771–72, 773 (1994) (“The Framers did not exalt warrants, for a warrant was issued ex parte by a
government official on the imperial payroll and had the purpose and effect of precluding any
common law trespass suit the aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury after the
search or seizure occurred. . . . Even when a judge issued a warrant, revolutionary Americans
greeted the event with foreboding.”); Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically
Measuring “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 289, 326–27 (2011) (“Although the British people were victims of . . . encroachments,
American colonists were even more susceptible to unreasonable searches and seizures because
colonial magistrates were obliged to authorize general warrants requested by crown officers based
on nothing more than mere suspicion. After the American Revolution, the Founders’ disgust for
abuses of general warrants (that were unsworn, unsupported by any particularized suspicion, and
lacked any degree of specificity with regard to the person or place to be searched or the item(s) to
be seized) led them first to adopt requirements for warrant specificity based on sworn,
particularized suspicion or probable cause in the charters or declaration of rights of several of the
new states and, later, in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”).
46. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)) (“Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a
search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the
clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have
sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’”). If the court finds that the officer acted in an
objectively reasonable manner, he or she will likely be immune from a suit of trespass or any kind
of personal liability. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
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are not.”47 Justice Scalia writing for a majority of the Court in Kyllo v.
United States openly mocked the warrant requirement:
One might think that . . . examining the portion of a house that is in
plain public view, while it is a “search” despite the absence of trespass, is not an “unreasonable” one under the Fourth Amendment. But
in fact we have held that visual observation is no “search” at all—
perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that
warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.48

By the early 2000s, the requirement of a warrant had become a requirement in name only. In fact, one study calculated that warranted searches
account for only a tiny fraction of the total number of searches conducted by law enforcement.49
Like the warrant requirement, the probable cause rule has also
become riddled with exceptions over the years.50 Beginning in Terry v.
Ohio and continuing for decades thereafter, the Supreme Court has held
that some searches can be done based on either the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion—one that does not appear in the Constitution and
has not been defined with great care by the Court—or based on something even less. Today, probable cause is the baseline test for all
searches and seizures—warranted or not—except when it is not: students can be searched at school based upon reasonable suspicion,51
police may detain and search suspects based on reasonable suspicion,52
and those arrested may be searched—even strip searched—without any
suspicion whatsoever.53
Over time the Court has thus riddled with exceptions both of its
iconic presumptions—warrants and probable cause—to such an extent
that it has begun to discard them altogether. As we document more fully
47. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572–73 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“That is, our cases stand
for the illuminating proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of
course, when they are not.”). For Justice Thomas as for Justice Scalia, the bottom line
determination in every case is whether the search that was conducted was reasonable.
48. 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (citations omitted).
49. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1666 (2012) (estimating that just over 1% of the total number of searches conducted by law
enforcement are conducted with a search warrant).
50. For Scalia, the warrant and the probable cause requirements are a distraction from the true
test for a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment—whether the law enforcement activity
would have been seen as reasonable at the time of the founding. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the path out of this confusion
should be sought by returning to the first principle that the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the
Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.”).
51. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012); see also Maryland v.
King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (permitting DNA testing of arrestee without any suspicion of
additional crimes).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-3\MIA305.txt

602

unknown

Seq: 14

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

2-MAY-14

13:09

[Vol. 68:589

in the next section, the Court has largely replaced its presumptions with
a totality of the circumstances reasonableness test. What is more, the
Court did so without explicitly announcing any change in doctrine.
But it is important to remember that not all reasonableness tests are
created equal. After all, following Katz, the Court used its presumptions—the warrant requirement and the probable cause requirement—to
give content to the Fourth Amendment’s own textual reasonableness
requirement. That is, in most instances, reasonableness meant a warrant
supported by probable cause; in some instances, it merely meant probable cause; in others, it meant something less. But used in this manner, reasonableness took its meaning from the text and interpretation
of the Amendment itself—this could be called Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.
By contrast, as we shall demonstrate, the reasonableness test now
employed by the Court is one almost entirely free of content. When
detached from the text of the Fourth Amendment—from the presumptions that defined the Fourth Amendment for so much of the twentieth
century—the reasonableness concept loses any inherent meaning it
might once have had. Today, what the Court means by reasonableness is
an unbounded totality of the circumstances balancing in which the rectitude of government conduct is inevitably evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. In the next subsection, we trace through how this doctrinal transformation has taken place in a number of different, unrelated contexts,
demonstrating that it lacks any clear, easily applied, objective rules.
B. The Spread of Reasonableness Across the Fourth Amendment
In context after context, the criminal procedure decisions of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts abandoned the clear rules of probable
cause and a warrant in favor of an increasingly free-wheeling form of
reasonableness balancing. In this subsection, we trace that development
across a decidedly non-exhaustive set of contexts and doctrines.
1.

INVESTIGATIVE STOPS

In both Terry v. Ohio decided in 1967 and Camara v. Superior
Court decided the following year, the Court extended the Fourth
Amendment to encompass encounters that could easily have been
excluded from its coverage—relatively minor criminal investigations
and non-criminal, administrative investigations.54 In doing so, however,
54. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as
‘stop’ and ‘frisk’ that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment
because neither action rises to the level of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the
Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion.”) (citations omitted).
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the Court created a conundrum. If the warrant and probable cause presumptions were to apply in all of these situations, law enforcement
might be impractically hamstrung. So, beginning in Terry and continuing in the years to come, the Court began formulating exceptions to
these requirements to accommodate the fact that the Fourth Amendment
now applied expansively. In doing so, the Court increasingly came to
rely on a reasonableness inquiry focused largely on the good intentions
of the officers.
Terry signaled the Court’s increased willingness to consider practical realities when defining the appropriate scope of the Fourth Amendment. Responding to the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in policesuspect interaction, the Court in 1968 held for the first time that some
searches and seizures could be done in the absence of both probable
cause and a warrant.55 The Terry decision begins by stating, in a single
paragraph and with almost no analysis, that the warrant and probable
cause presumptions do not apply to the conduct at issue and that the
propriety of the stop and frisk in the case should be determined solely
under the reasonableness clause:
[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead,
the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.56

Only Justice Douglas dissented from the holding in Terry. He would
have adhered to the probable cause requirement for the arrest at issue,
though apparently not the warrant requirement.57 He criticized the
majority for authorizing the officer on the street to engage in searches—
those done upon less than probable cause—that no magistrate could
authorize.58 Justice Marshall, almost two decades later, would reiterate
that the seemingly benign reasonableness test prescribed in Terry is
dangerously incompatible with liberty: “To those who rank zealous
law enforcement above all other values, it may be tempting to divorce
55. Exigent circumstances was a recognized exception prior to Terry; however, probable
cause was required for exigent circumstances searches or seizures: There must be probable cause
to believe there is an exigency, and probable cause that there is some evidence of a crime or an
emergency.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 36, 39 (“Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him
up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him in their
discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate
by the people of this country.”).
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Terry from its rationales and merge the two prongs of Terry into the
single requirement that the police act reasonably under the circumstances when they stop and investigate on less than probable cause.”59
2.

THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE

Perhaps no area of Fourth Amendment doctrine provides greater
evidence for the ascendancy of reasonableness balancing than the special needs doctrine. This doctrine, based on the principle that a lesser
showing should be necessary when the government searches for noncriminal enforcement purposes, today governs an enormous amount of
conduct, from searches at schools and airports, to drug testing on the job
and in schools, to road-side sobriety tests and many more.
The Court began its foray into the special needs doctrine in Camara
v. Municipal Court60 in 1967—just a year before Terry was decided. In
Camara, the Court was asked to pass on the constitutionality of a warrantless housing inspection of Camara’s property.61 The Court held that
even though the search was conducted by health and safety officials
rather than police officers investigating a crime, the conduct was governed by both the probable cause and warrant presumptions.62 However,
the Court, having stated this orthodoxy, almost immediately struck a
retreat from it. It held that a warrant in this context could be supported
by “area probable cause,” an idea unknown in the Fourth Amendment
before or since.63 The area probable cause test had more to do with procedural regularity—with making sure that the officers conducting the
search had been authorized by statute to do so—than with any kind of
individualized suspicion. So while the Court nominally adhered to the
warrant and probable cause requirements in Camara, it was obligated to
redefine these concepts almost entirely to do so.
But maintaining two definitions of probable cause could not be sustained. In the years that followed, the Court found it easier to relax the
strict requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause than to
tinker with what each of these terms mean in various contexts. In this
way, Terry has proven far more influential than Camara.64 While the
59. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 691 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). It is worth
noting that Marshall begins his opinion by reminding the reader that Terry was a narrow exception
to the probable cause requirement.
60. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
61. Id. at 525.
62. Id. at 540.
63. See, e.g., Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 Yale L. J. 521, 522
(1968) (In Camara, “[t]he Court went on to give its blessing to a new species of ‘area probable
cause’ for housing inspection warrants—a standard requiring a substantially lesser showing than
that needed to justify a criminal search warrant.”).
64. Sundby, supra note 13, at 395 (“Building upon Camara, the Court’s decision in Terry v.
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Supreme Court could have made probable cause a contextual issue, with
the definition of the required probability changing from search to search
and from context to context, it instead retreated from its one-size-fits-all
approach to what the Fourth Amendment mandates. Out went probable
cause and in came a more flexible approach based on reasonableness.
As the issues surrounding non-criminal searches recurred time and
again, the Court developed a new doctrine, dubbed the special needs
doctrine by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.65 In special needs cases, the government interest in conducting a
search is balanced against the privacy interest of the individual implicated by the search. The Court has used this doctrine to uphold suspicionless drug testing of railway workers,66 Treasury employees,67 high
school students engaged in extracurricular activities,68 searches of
school children and their belongings based on reasonable suspicion,69
and checkpoints for illegal immigrants70 and drunk driving71 (but not
drugs)72; among many, many others.
In the early special needs cases, the Supreme Court was careful to
emphasize that the special needs doctrine was a narrow exception to the
general warrant requirement.73 In case after case, context after context,
Ohio provided reasonableness an even greater role as an independent factor in fourth amendment
analysis.”).
65. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Only in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”).
66. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
67. Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
68. Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
69. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
70. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
71. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
72. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (“Where a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court
has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. Warrants
cannot be issued, of course, without the showing of probable cause required by the Warrant
Clause. But a warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches;
and when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable
cause is not invariably required either. A search unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional, we have said, ‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66
(“While we have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search must be supported, as a
general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause . . . . our cases establish that where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the
Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
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the Court upheld searches and seizures conducted with neither probable
cause nor a warrant but was always careful to describe these cases as
unusual. Sincere or not, the Court paid lip service to the warrant and
probable cause presumptions in these cases, repeating that reasonableness, at least in the run-of-the-mill case, is defined by true probable
cause and a warrant. The special needs cases were, at least on paper,
special.
By 2006, however, it had become clear that the Court’s lip service
to the traditional reading of the Fourth Amendment was little more than
that. In Samson v. California,74 the Supreme Court began its analysis of
the constitutionality of a suspicionless search of a parolee thusly:
[U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach we “examin[e] the
totality of the circumstances” to determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whether a
search is reasonable “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.75

The Samson Court does not even cabin its decision in the language of
special needs; it does not view suspicionless searches as unusual, let
alone presumptively unconstitutional. By contrast, it describes balancing
of intrusiveness against government interest as application of “general
Fourth Amendment principles.”76 Such an approach was predicted years
individualized suspicion in the particular context.”); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The ‘special needs’ doctrine, which has been used to uphold certain suspicionless
searches performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement, is an exception to the general rule
that a search must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”) (internal citation
omitted); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (“In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion.”) (emphasis added); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (“When such
‘special needs’—concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the
competing private and public interests advanced by the parties.”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 741 (1987) (“[O]nly when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a
government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing the
ultimate goals to which a search would contribute, does the court turn to a ‘balancing’ test to
formulate a standard of reasonableness for this context.”).
74. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
75. Id. at 848 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001)). Earlier cases
have cleared the way for this understanding of the special needs cases. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 333 (beginning legal analysis with the following sentence: “In determining whether the search
at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question
whether that Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches
conducted by public school officials.”).
76. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3 (2006).
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earlier by Justice Blackmun, who feared that because the reasonableness
clause is not self-defining, the Fourth Amendment would lose concrete
meaning if untethered from the warrant and probable cause requirements.77 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., for example, Blackmun cautioned that
“the Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and
decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause,”78 and expressed concern over the trend
by which “the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception.”79
Picking up Justice Blackmun’s cause, Justice Stevens’ Samson dissent
calls the Court’s rewriting of the Fourth Amendment here “an unprecedented curtailment of liberty.”80 But the Court pushed ahead
undaunted.81
3.

CONSENT

Consent is the exception to the warrant or probable cause requirements most commonly invoked by law enforcement.82 A staggering percentage of all warrantless searches are based on consent, and consent has
77. As the special needs doctrine was metastasizing across the Fourth Amendment, a number
of Justices sounded the alarm. For example, in his concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice
Blackmun calls the Court to task for omitting a crucial step in its analysis:
I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school search
must be based upon probable cause. The Court correctly states that we have
recognized limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement “[w]here a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is
best served” by a lesser standard. I believe that we have used such a balancing test,
rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable-Cause
Clause, only when we were confronted with “a special law enforcement need for
greater flexibility.”
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983)). Similarly, in his
dissent in Katz v. United States, Justice Black argues against a fundamental shift away from the
text of the Fourth Amendment and toward the vague reasonable expectation of privacy test:
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth
Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly
to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and
seizures as one to protect an individual’s privacy. By clever word juggling the Court
finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures
of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to
eavesdropped evidence of conversations that can neither be searched nor seized. . . .
Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court’s language, designed to protected privacy,
for the Constitution’s language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all
laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest concept of
privacy.
389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967).
78. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
79. Id. at 352.
80. Samson, 547 U.S. at 857.
81. See infra Part II.B.
82. Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding
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emerged as yet another area in which reasonableness defines the content
of the Fourth Amendment. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the
validity of consent as an exception to the warrant requirement turns on
two basic inquiries: the voluntariness of the consent and the authority of
the person who consents over the property searched. Under the Court’s
current view of the Fourth Amendment, both of these inquiries are fundamentally questions of reasonableness.
Consent is invalid if it is made out of fear, confusion, or is not
otherwise voluntary.83 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,84 the Supreme
Court refused to require police warnings regarding one’s right to refuse
consent85 and instead held that the voluntariness of one’s consent is to
be determined by a totality of the circumstances balancing.86 The Court
explained, “It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal,
unstructured context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of
tainting the evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of [waiver]”
provided in other contexts.87 In short, “[v]oluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s
knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the
prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”88 The dissent had difficulty
hiding its disgust with this approach.89
the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (“Over 90% of warrantless police
searches are accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.”).
83. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
84. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
85. Id. at 227. The obvious parallel here is to the warnings the Court had mandated several
years earlier in Miranda v. Arizona. If these warnings were a necessary prophylactic to ensure the
full enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination, then surely similar warnings should be
required to facilitate the enforcement of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
86. Id. at 249. For the dissenters, the majority’s approach was hopelessly flawed. The
voluntariness inquiry of the self-incrimination cases was simply the wrong tool for the job.
(“[T]his case deals not with ‘coercion,’ but with ‘consent,’ a subtly different concept to which
different standards have been applied in the past. Freedom from coercion is a substantive right,
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Consent, however, is a mechanism by which
substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are avoided. In the context of the Fourth
Amendment, the relevant substantive requirements are that searches be conducted only after
evidence justifying them has been submitted to an impartial magistrate for a determination of
probable cause.”). Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 248–49.
89. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds today that an individual can
effectively waive this right even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his
consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me
how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a
constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. In my view, the Court’s
conclusion is supported neither by ‘linguistics,’ nor by ‘epistemology,’ nor, indeed, by ‘common
sense.’”); Id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday the Court reaches the curious result that
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The question of who has the authority to consent is also increasingly determined by a reasonableness inquiry. In United States v. Matlock90 the Supreme Court held:
When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof
of voluntary consent it is not limited to proof that consent was given
by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was
obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected.91

In Matlock, the Court held that consent obtained from a co-tenant was
not unreasonable even though the defendant was himself already handcuffed and in the back of a police car at the time the consent was given
by his girlfriend.92 Although this might have been an efficient choice,
Justice Douglas argued in dissent that this is not what is required by the
Constitution. Citing three cases from 1948, Justice Douglas indicated his
belief that a warrant based upon probable cause, not reasonableness, had
historically been required before any search of a private home had been
upheld by the Supreme Court.93 For Douglas, Matlock constituted a significant departure from precedent, an untethering of the Fourth Amendment from its text and history.94
A similar but distinguishable set of facts forced the Court to return
to the issue a few years later. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, consent was given
by the defendant’s ex-girlfriend who had previously—but no longer—
shared an apartment with the defendant.95 The Court emphasized two
facts about the case. First, it stressed that as a factual matter, the exgirlfriend did not have common authority and control over the premises
such that she was authorized to consent to their search.96 Second, it conone can choose to relinquish a constitutional right—the right to be free of unreasonable
searches—without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request to
search.”); Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is regrettable that the obsession with validating
searches like that conducted in this case, so evident in the Court’s hyperbole, has obscured the
Court’s vision of how the Fourth Amendment was designed to govern the relationship between
police and citizen in our society.”).
90. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
91. Id. at 171.
92. Id. at 166. Interestingly, later cases would make clear that if Matlock had been present (as
opposed to restrained nearby), his refusal to consent would have trumped his girlfriend’s consent.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (finding that the consent of an occupant
of a home was invalid in the face of a present, objecting co-resident). Perhaps it was no accident,
then, that the officers did not seek consent until Matlock was safely ensconced in the car nearby.
93. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 183–87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also dissented, on the basis of his dissent in
Schneckloth. In Schneckloth, Justices Brennan and Marshall would have required the government
to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of his right to withhold consent. 412 U.S. at 277.
95. 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
96. Id. at 181–82.
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cluded that the officers reasonably believed that she was so authorized.97
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated on these
facts because the officers behaved reasonably in obtaining consent from
someone they believed was authorized to give it.98 While, unlike in Matlock, they did not receive consent from someone actually authorized to
give it, the officers reasonably believed that they had consent and that
reasonable belief was sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.99
The dissent—taken up this time by Justice Marshall—lamented the
distance the Court had travelled from its presumption in favor of warrants supported by probable cause: “The baseline for the reasonableness
of a search or seizure in the home is the presence of a warrant.”100 Justice Marshall argued that even if the Court was not willing to reach the
conclusion that in the absence of exigency consent searches were inherently unconstitutional, it should at least put upon the government the
risk that the consent obtained was imperfect. That is, the government
should be able to proceed without a warrant, but at the risk of having
evidence excluded if it is later determined that the consent obtained was
faulty. But the Court’s majority clearly disagreed. For the majority, the
central focus was on the good will of the officers rather than the accuracy of their assessment of the situation. This exclusive focus on the
reasonableness of police conduct—in a way unmoored from the specific
requirements and text of the Fourth Amendment—would come to typify
the Fourth Amendment approach of the last twenty-five years.
4.

CONCLUSION

We have discussed three examples of the spread of unbounded reasonableness throughout the Fourth Amendment here, but we could have
added many others. In fact, all indications are that the Supreme Court is
not just accelerating its use of groundless reasonableness, but that totality of the circumstances balancing has become the new normal in Fourth
Amendment adjudication.
As we noted above, in Samson v. California the Court began its
analysis without reference to warrants, probable cause, or special needs,
stating simply that reasonableness is the ultimate test of the validity of a
search or seizure.101 Indeed, the Court did not so much as cite the Katz
decision in elaborating on the application of the Fourth Amendment.102
The last seven years have made abundantly clear that Samson was not
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“Under our general Fourth Amendment
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simply a one-off decision. For example, in 2012, in Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders, the Court evaluated a jail’s policy of strip-searching all those admitted.103 The Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis with a discussion of the difficulties of running a jail before even
turning, in the next section, to what it saw as the ultimate question
presented: “[W]hether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail
supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt
from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband.”104 The fact that the
searches were supported by neither probable cause nor a warrant was not
deemed remarkable by the Court.
Similarly, in 2013, in Maryland v. King,105 the Court, in determining the constitutionality of a suspicionless, warrantless buccal swab to
obtain DNA evidence from a detainee, addressed the Fourth Amendment
question thusly:
As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.”
In giving content to the inquiry whether an intrusion is reasonable,
the Court has preferred “some quantum of individualized suspicion
. . . [as]a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion.”106

In short, not only does the Court no longer cite the cases that established the warrant and probable cause requirements—nor the cases that
held that exceptions to the warrant and probable cause presumptions
were narrow and few—instead it explicitly states that there is “no irreducible requirement” before a search can be conducted. What began as a
requirement and then became a presumption, has now been almost fully
discarded.
II.

THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY: FROM AUTOMATIC

TO

UNLIKELY

The previous section traced the evolution of the Fourth Amendment
from clear, definitive rules to an ungrounded reasonableness balancing
approach we examin[e] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
103. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1510 (2012).
104. Id. at 1512.
105. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
106. Id. at 1969 (internal citation omitted). Moreover, even where the Court rules against the
government, its most prominent recent decisions look for ways to put distance between Katz and
the modern Fourth Amendment. In both U.S. v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that
a search had occurred; however, it did not rely on the Katz framework, and it did not even decide
whether a warrant or probable cause were required to conduct such searches. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
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test. This section demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule has followed a remarkably similar path from certainty to
obscurity. After tracing this history, we discuss the pernicious effect this
double transformation has wrought on both individual liberties and the
stability and predictability of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
A.

A Blanket Rule

The exclusionary rule entered the Supreme Court’s arsenal in 1914
in Weeks v. United States.107 In that case, the Court held for the first
time that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded at trial.108 The Court’s language invoking this remedy for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment was categorical:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.109

When the exclusionary rule was made mandatory in state court
prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, the Court made clear that exclusion applied with exactly the same force against the states that it did
against the federal government, that is, categorically:
Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be “a form of words,”
valueless and undeserving . . . .110

Thus, just twelve years after the Fourth Amendment was first applied to
the states,111 the Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states and
applied it with the same categorical power that it had in the Federal
Courts.112
Indeed, for many years, the Court treated the exclusionary rule as a
necessary adjutant of the Fourth Amendment. This is evident from many
of the Court’s seminal mid-century criminal procedure decisions. For
107. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Technically, there appear to be prior cases suggesting that exclusion
was appropriate, but there was no analysis or discussion of the exclusionary rule in these earlier
cases. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (concluding that the illegally seized
materials could not be used at the defendant’s trial).
108. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
109. Id. at 393.
110. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
111. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
112. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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example in Whiteley v. Warden, the entirety of the Court’s exclusionary
rule analysis was the following: “[P]etitioner’s arrest violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should have been excluded from his
trial, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).”113 Similarly in Katz v.
United States, the Court took as orthodoxy that all evidence illegally
seized could not be used by the government in its case in chief: “The
government agents here ignored ‘the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment’ . . . . Because the
surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the
petitioner’s conviction, the judgment must be reversed.”114 The possibility that a conviction could stand that was based in part on illegally
seized evidence seems not even to have occurred to the Court.115
B. A Familiar Tale: From Rule to Presumption to Balancing
Over time, however, the Court would begin to carve exceptions into
the edifice of the exclusionary rule. In direct parallel to the changes taking place in substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine during this time,
the Court continued to recognize exclusion as a rule but now saw it as a
rule that came with a number of exceptions. For example, the Court
concluded that the exclusionary rule could only be invoked by those
who could demonstrate a violation of their own rights as opposed to
another’s rights. In Rakas v. Illinois116 the Court refused to consider the
substance of Rakas’ challenge to the search of a car in which he was a
passenger. Because Rakas had neither a possessory nor a property interest in the car searched, the Court reasoned, he was not entitled to challenge its search.117 Although Rakas has been critiqued as needlessly reimporting property law notions into the Fourth Amendment calculus,118
113. Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971).
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (internal citations omitted).
115. Id. This quotation also proves too much. The Court did not say, though it might have, that
the conviction below would be permitted to stand if it was shown that the admission of the tainted
evidence was harmless error.
116. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
117. Id. at 148.
118. See, e.g., id. at 156 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the Fourth
Amendment protects property, not people . . . .”); Note, Supreme Court, 1978 Term: 1. Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy against Unreasonable Searches, 93 HARV. L. REV. 171, 178 (1979) (“In
the name of developing the Katz ‘privacy’ test, the Rakas Court has instead revived the centrality
of property and possession by explicitly investing only the owner/possessor with a clear
‘legitimate expectation.’”); Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of
Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 190 (2012) (“[I]n Rakas v. Illinois, the Court
explicitly reintroduced notions of property law into the Fourth Amendment in order to determine
the presence of an objective expectation of privacy. Meaning that, despite being couched in the
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the general principle—that exclusion is only available to one whose own
rights have been violated—is relatively unremarkable. It weakens the
exclusionary rule, but it does little to take away from its status as a rule;
exclusion is still required whenever a criminal defendant can demonstrate that her own constitutional rights were violated.119
Until recently, however, the biggest hole the Supreme Court has
carved out of the exclusionary rule—one that threatens to swallow all of
the others—is good faith reliance. It began in United States v. Leon120
with good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant. There, the Court
held that the warrant issued by the magistrate after an exhaustive investigation was invalid because it was not supported by probable cause.121
However, the Court went on to hold that exclusion was unwarranted
because it would not serve any deterrent purpose.122 Because the exclusionary rule exists primarily to deter police misconduct, the Court reasoned, and because the only misconduct was the issuance of a warrant
without probable cause by a neutral magistrate, exclusion would not
have a deterrent effect.123 One might quarrel with the Leon rule, but at
the very least, it must be recognized as a rule that entrenched the Fourth
Amendment preference for warrants. If officers obtained a facially valid
warrant from a neutral magistrate, then they had done all the Fourth
Amendment could ask of them. Later cases extended good faith reliance
to include reliance on a statute later held to be unconstitutional124 and to
reliance on a judicial clerk’s error.125 Again, the Court focused on the
fact that the officers had attempted to comply with the dictates of the
Constitution.
For all of the exceptions and limitations that the Supreme Court
placed on the exclusionary rule in the fifty years after Mapp, until
recently it generally treated exclusion as at least a default rule and as
normative language of privacy from Katz, the debate has since more closely resembled the one
from the Olmstead era—an assessment of the ability to control and exclude observation premised
upon established notions of property law.”).
119. “Standing” is not the only judicially created loophole to the exclusionary rule, of course.
Another major weakening of the exclusionary rule is the admission of illegally seized evidence for
impeachment. The reason for this exception is that the deterrent rationale that justifies exclusion is
weakened by the extra layer of uncertainty; the Court thought it unlikely that an officer would
illegally seize evidence, knowing it could not be used in the government’s case-in-chief in the
hopes that it will keep a defendant from perjuring himself on the stand. Similarly, the Supreme
Court held that illegally seized evidence was admissible in non-criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation hearings); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings).
120. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
121. Id. at 898.
122. Id. at 916–17.
123. Id. at 916.
124. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
125. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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something akin to a barely rebuttable presumption. In 2006, however,
the same year that Samson v. California was decided, the Supreme Court
decided Hudson v. Michigan, which was in many ways the most important criminal procedure decision of the last twenty-five years.126 In Hudson, the Court fundamentally changed the relationship between the
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, albeit in dicta. No longer
was exclusion the rule, subject to a few, narrowly circumscribed exceptions. Rather, exclusion was now, in the Court’s words, the remedy of
last resort.127
The Hudson Court’s assault on the exclusionary rule was multifaceted. The first part of the Court’s opinion held that the evidence
obtained in the case did not derive from a Fourth Amendment violation
and therefore need not be excluded.128 Although the Court had long recognized that the Fourth Amendment generally requires officers to knock
and announce before executing a search warrant at a home,129 and
although the officers had failed to do so in this case, the Court reasoned
that exclusion was not necessary because the failure to knock and
announce had not led to the discovery of the contested evidence:
In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.
Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police
would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have
discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.130

More broadly, the Court stressed that exclusion is not an available remedy where the evidence obtained is unrelated to the particular Fourth
Amendment protection in question. As the Court explained: “Since the
interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the
seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”131 The
126. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella & Alice H. Choi, Evaluating Hudson v. Michigan and Its
Impact on the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 44 No. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 10 (2008)
(“The U.S. Supreme Court case Hudson v. Michigan, decided in 2006, has had a huge impact on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Hudson has practically eviscerated the knock-and-announce
rule. More significantly, by reframing the causation and the cost/benefit balancing tests of the
exclusionary rule, Hudson has emasculated the exclusionary rule.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“Hudson
v. Michigan is a case we should view with alarm. . . . [T]he problem in Hudson was not upholding
Hudson’s conviction, but rather how the Court upheld it (by modifying the exclusionary rule) and,
even more importantly, why the Court chose to modify the rule.”); see also Christopher D. Totten,
The Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. Michigan: Mourning the Death of the Knock and
Announce Rule, 46 No. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 843, 897 (2010).
127. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence . . . has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse.”).
128. Id. at 594.
129. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
130. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
131. Id. at 594.
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knock and announce requirement, as the Court rightly noted, protects
dignitary harms, not evidentiary ones.132 Because the rule is designed
primarily to allow the target of the search the opportunity to get out of
bed or put on clothing before encountering the officers,133 the Court reasoned, the illegal discovery of evidence when there is a failure to knock
and announce is attenuated from or unrelated to the Fourth Amendment
protection at issue.134
Having provided a compelling and sufficient reason not to exclude
evidence from the case, the Court could obviously have stopped.135 It
did not do so, however. The next section of the Court’s opinion stated
that the exclusionary rule was and always had been a remedy of last
resort rather than a first impulse.136 Although this statement of the law
benefits from a colorful turn of phrase, it is, as we have already seen,
demonstrably wrong. Others have documented the Orwellian revisionist
history of this aspect of Hudson—Oceania has always been at war with
Eurasia.137 Rather than being a last resort, for nearly all of its life, the
exclusionary rule has been seen as the logical consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation.
Much as Samson marked a new normal for substantive Fourth
Amendment analysis, it immediately became clear Hudson was the
Court’s new model for exclusionary rule analysis. Indeed, Hudson
marks the beginning of the end of exclusionary rule absolutism. Three
years later, in Herring v. United States,138 the Court reiterated the assertion that exclusion was a remedy of last resort and, for the first time,
132. Id.
133. A more interesting question is presented when the officers are armed with an arrest
warrant but not a search warrant. The officers are entitled to arrest an individual at her own home
with just an arrest warrant—by contrast they must also have a search warrant if they wish to arrest
a defendant at a third party’s home. But, if an individual chooses to leave the home and surrender
to the police, the officers are entitled neither to enter the home nor to search it incident to arrest.
134. Id. at 593. Of course, by such logic, one could never suppress evidence obtained during an
illegal seizure because the prohibition on unreasonable seizures protects freedom of movement
rather than privacy.
135. The irony here is that the Court dismisses the language of Mapp stating that evidence
seized in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in the state courts is dicta. The language
quoted by the Court, however, is the holding of Mapp—that the exclusionary rule applies with
equal force in state and federal prosecutions. To call this dicta is to say that everything but the
actual holding—that the evidence obtained from Mapp’s home should be suppressed is dicta. This
is of course nonsense. The very point of announcing rules—a point the Court often trumpets—is
to create precedent on which actors can rely. Under the Court’s apparent view of precedent and
dicta, all rules are dicta because they are unnecessary to the holding (the evidence is inadmissible
in this case).
136. Id. at 591.
137. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 34 (Signet Classic 1950) (“Oceania was at war with Eurasia:
therefore Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia.”).
138. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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held that an officer’s good faith reliance on another police official’s mistake would prevent application of the exclusionary rule.139 In Herring,
the arresting officer believed that there was a warrant outstanding for the
defendant’s arrest and checked with clerks both in his county and an
adjoining one to determine if that was correct.140 The neighboring
county’s clerk affirmed the presence of a warrant, though in reality the
warrant had earlier been withdrawn and appears to have been improperly
issued in the first place.141 Herring was nonetheless arrested, and
methamphetamine and a pistol were found in his truck.142 Explicitly
wedding the appropriateness of exclusion to a balancing test considering
the officer’s culpability, the Court reasoned that because the case
involved only isolated negligence on the part of the officers maintaining
the warrants database, deterrence was unlikely to be effective.143
It seems almost unfair at this point to critique the logic of Herring—that negligent conduct cannot be deterred through sanctions. As
the dissent pointed out, our entire tort system is based on the concept
that negligent conduct—even blameless conduct—can be discouraged
through the prospect of civil liability.144 Nonetheless, just as the content
of the Fourth Amendment right has shifted from rigid rules to an assessment of the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, in Herring, exclusion was deemed inappropriate because the officer was acting
reasonably. Herring, then, represents a monumental shift in the Court’s
approach to the exclusionary rule. When Herring was itself extended
two years later by Davis v. United States,145 the Roberts Court’s transformation of the exclusionary rule was complete. In Davis the Court
held that a search that violated Arizona v. Gant146—a case decided after
Davis was arrested but before his case was final on appeal—violated the
Fourth Amendment but did not warrant exclusion.147 The Court rea139. Id. at 144–46.
140. Id. at 137.
141. Id.; see Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 463, 466 n.14 (2009) (establishing that the uncontradicted testimony in the record
established that the warrant was improperly issued).
142. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137–38.
143. Id. at 145.
144. Id. at 153 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“The exclusionary rule, the Court suggests, is capable
of only marginal deterrence when the misconduct at issue is merely careless, not intentional or
reckless. The suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law—that liability for
negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater care.”).
145. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
146. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). In Gant, the Court limited the search incident to arrest authorized in
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) to those situations in which “the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Gant, 556
U.S. at 343.
147. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431–32.
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soned that although there was no question that the officers had violated
Davis’ Fourth Amendment rights, they were not acting unreasonably—
they were following the law as it was then understood—and thus, exclusion was not warranted.148
Taken together, Hudson, Herring, and Davis represent a fundamental reworking of the exclusionary rule. This doctrinal shift is the Roberts
Court’s most lasting contribution to the field of criminal procedure.
Whereas the exclusionary remedy was treated as obvious and automatic
in Katz, it is treated today as an extraordinary remedy to be reserved for
cases of extreme officer culpability. The officers in Katz, no less than
the officers in Davis, were celebrated by the Court for having acted reasonably under existing law,149 yet exclusion was deemed necessary in
Katz and dismissively rejected in Davis. Far from a hard and fast rule, or
even a presumption subject to certain, limited exceptions, the exclusionary rule now requires a fact-specific inquiry into the culpability of the
officer, and where an officer was acting reasonably, even when the
Fourth Amendment was violated, exclusion is not permitted.150
III.

UNDERSTANDING

THE

PROBLEM

WITH

DOUBLE REASONABLENESS

There are at least three problems with the overlapping reasonableness tests that currently dominate Fourth Amendment adjudication.
First, the system breeds confusion and a conflation between rights and
remedies—the two are inextricably linked, and clarity and precision
regarding the limits of each are necessarily lost as a result. Second, the
current application of the reasonableness doctrine is selective and tends
to skew in favor of government conduct at the expense of individual
liberty. And third, the double reasonableness analysis reflects a view of
substantive Fourth Amendment rights that is unnecessarily constrained—in many cases the right was cabined to avoid a disruptive remedy at a time when exclusion was a virtual certainty. In short, current
doctrine is both unclear and skewed by the dissolution and convergence
of both substantive and remedial Fourth Amendment law.
148. Id. at 2428–29. See Cathy Herasimchuk, Fifth Circuit Survey: June 1994–May 1995
Criminal Procedure, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 685, 694 (1996) (“The general legal principle,
however, is that ‘new’ legal rules apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal at the
time the new rule is announced unless the new rule’s retroactive application has already been
specifically settled by other precedent.”).
149. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (noting that the officers were not acting in a manner that
was inconsistent with prior decisions of the Supreme Court such as Olmstead).
150. Andrew G. Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary
Rules, FLA. L. REV. 36–37 (forthcoming) (observing that the new, culpability-focused
exclusionary rule regime will require suppression hearings to be expanded so as to allow for,
among other things, defense inquiries into the officer’s level of culpability based on training and
experience).
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Conflating Rights and Remedies

When a reasonableness test is subjected to a second level of reasonableness review confusion is virtually certain. The Fourth Amendment is
no exception. To get a sense of just how ungrounded the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is at the moment, it is useful
to reflect on how difficult it can be in a given case even to determine
whether the Court is considering the merits of a constitutional claim or
whether it is deciding the defendant’s entitlement to a remedy.
Consider again, the Court’s seminal decision in Herring v. United
States. In Herring, the defendant was wrongly arrested when a warrant
check by patrol officers erroneously returned an outstanding warrant for
the defendant; in fact, the warrant in question had been recalled far earlier and remained on the books through the negligence of a clerk in the
police department.151 The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary remedy was not justified because the arresting officer had not acted
unreasonably in relying on the assurance that the defendant was subject
to arrest.152 That is to say, because the arresting officer reasonably relied
on an administrator’s erroneous conclusion that there was an outstanding
warrant, the officer lacked any individual culpability and exclusion was
not warranted. Furthermore, because the police clerk’s mistake was an
example of ordinary negligence rather than systemic negligence, the
Court found that the costs of exclusion would outweigh any benefit.153
But if, as the Court now tells us, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’”154 then the Court might just as
easily have concluded that there was no constitutional violation in this
case at all. To say that the officer acted reasonably in relying on the
existence of a warrant is to say both that there was no violation and that
there was no intentional misconduct to deter through exclusion.155
Determining why the Supreme Court focused a priori on the remedy
rather than the right is impossible; perhaps it was whim or caprice, perhaps the remedial question was more interesting to the Court, or perhaps
no one on the Court noticed that the same analysis applied to both
questions.156
151. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137–38.
152. Id. at 137.
153. Id. at 141.
154. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
155. See, e.g., Bernadette Turi Romano, Is the New Standard for the Fourth Amendment
Particularity Requirement in Obscenity Cases “I Know it when I Seize it?,” 39 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1113, 1135 (1988) (“To say that an officer should act ‘reasonably’ in seizing materials is wholly
subjective, and thus, completely undermines the constitutional mandate of particularity.”); see
also Kathyrn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the
Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 623, 691–92 (1995).
156. Certiorari was granted on the question of whether suppression was required on the facts of
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As should be clear by now, we think this conflation is problematic.
Perhaps the most obvious problems involve the so-called right-remedy
gap in constitutional law157—that is, the disconnect between the promise
of substantive rights and the limited availability of a remedy for a
demonstrated violation of a right.158 Whether one celebrates or objects
to the tension between an idealized vision of the right and its practical
application, there is substantial value in being able to distinguish one
from the other—the right from the remedy.159 In a case like Herring, for
example, we cannot say with confidence, nor does the Court, that there
was in fact a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, those wellversed in the Fourth Amendment might disagree about whether there
was a constitutional injury in that case.
Such ambiguity is problematic even for those who recognize a
relaxed remedial scheme as a necessary corollary to a robust set of
rights. As one commentator has explained:
The absolute language of rights helps protect rights from being obliterated by competing concerns. Rights rhetoric fosters a love of liberty
that makes a system of individual rights effective. It promotes the
recognition of the corresponding rights of others and of new areas of
our common life that ought to be made more free. Above all, it helps
to lift our national spirits, pointing out our highest aspirations and
supplying the glue that bonds us as a people.160

If the right qua right is to serve civic purposes even when pragmatically
constrained by limited remedies,161 of course, then at the very least we
must know what the contours of that right are. That is to say, even
accepting that there must be a gulf between the right as promised and the
right in practical application to encourage the Court to say what the law
is, the current system of Fourth Amendment adjudication makes it
the case, 2007 WL 3045540. However, the question of whether the Fourth Amendment was
violated is a threshold question in the exclusionary rule analysis, and the government had not
conceded a Fourth Amendment violation in this case.
157. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87, 87–88 (1999); Gewirtz, supra note 5, at 587.
158. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in
America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 278 (2010) (“Rights lead dual lives, much like Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde. Perhaps the Jekyll is the right’s luminous place in our rhetoric and the Hyde is the right as it
exists on the streets.”).
159. Most of the debate to date has been about how to address the space between rights and
remedies. See id. at 279 (“Although the two camps differ over whether the solution is to tamp
down the rhetoric or ramp up the practice of rights, they agree that rhetoric and practice must be
forced into alignment.”). Increasingly, it is important to try and understand how to distinguish the
right from the remedy.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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impossible to know what the right entails. The line between right and
remedy is blurred to the point of indeterminacy.
Stated differently, the overlapping nature of Fourth Amendment
rights and remedies threatens to envelope the area of law in a doctrinal
fog. If the right were subject to fixed, rigid rules and the remedy were
automatic, courts would be forced to expound with specificity on the
content and scope of the right. If the right were rigid and fixed, but the
remedy were rare and subject to balancing, then perhaps few defendants
will obtain a remedy, but the content of the right would be clear, and
later plaintiffs would be more likely to prevail. But where both the remedy and the right are both governed by reasonableness balancing inquiries, there is no substantive clarity and little chance of remedial recovery.
Moreover, in a framework governed by two tiers of reasonableness
tests, the law will develop, at best, slowly and haphazardly. If in a given
case the challenged official conduct is not squarely prohibited by previous case law, then it is unlikely that the exclusionary rule (or civil relief)
would be available.162 In most such instances the question of the existence of a right is rendered irrelevant by the fact that no remedy will be
available in the absence of clearly established law. In short, the culpability assessments that have become commonplace at both the right and the
remedy stage preclude clarity.
And while confusion and opacity are bad enough on their own, it
should be noted that the burden of this lack of clarity is born entirely by
those asserting violations by law enforcement. While officers in the field
would no doubt prefer to have clear rules to govern their conduct, they
162. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 528 (2007) (“If the Fourth Amendment simply asked whether police behavior were
‘reasonable,’ the police would have little way to know ex ante whether the evidence they collected
would end up being suppressed.”); Jeffry R. Gittins, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending
the Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized During Unauthorized Nighttime
Searches, BYU L. REV. 451, 451 (2007) (“In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first
introduced the exclusionary rule. Under this rule, evidence obtained pursuant to an unreasonable
search and seizure under Fourth Amendment standards cannot be used in subsequent criminal
trials. Since that time, courts struggled to determine when application of the exclusionary rule was
the correct remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. One such struggle concerned the ‘knockand-announce’ rule, which requires law enforcement officials to announce their identity and
purpose before forcibly entering a private residence to execute a warrant. Although the Supreme
Court held that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was a factor in determining the
reasonableness of a search, the Court did not clarify whether or not the exclusionary rule should
apply to such violations. The result was that some courts suppressed evidence obtained in knockand-announce violation cases, while other courts did not. Finally, in 2006, the Court clarified the
issue in Hudson v. Michigan.”); Richard E. Hillary, II, Arizona v. Evans and the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: The Exception is Swallowing the Rule, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.
473, 503 (1996) (“Evans represents a further deterioration of the Fourth Amendment rights of the
American people. The utilization of ever-increasing technological advances in law enforcement
should have caused the Court to implement appropriate safeguards in the use of these advances.”).
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are in many ways protected by a lack of substantive clarity. So long as
the substance of a right is unclear, evidence will not be suppressed; an
officer working in the face of a murky rule will inevitably be found to
have behaved reasonably. Similarly, under current qualified immunity
doctrine, a lack of clarity with regard to the substance of a right protects
the officer from civil suits as well.163
B. Reasonable Distortion of Doctrine
The overlapping reasonableness tests described above have distorted the Fourth Amendment in two important ways. First, the Court
has engaged in a very selective application of baseline reasonableness
that, in many instances, serves as a one-way ratchet that limits, but never
expands, Fourth Amendment rights. Second, there is a path-dependency
to substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine—many of the Court’s rules
were created at a time when exclusion was an absolute remedy. The
specter of automatic exclusion colored substantive doctrine and has created a set of harsh rules that no longer make sense in light of the fact that
exclusion is now, in the Court’s words, a last resort rather than a first
impulse.
1.

REASONABLENESS

AS A

ONE-WAY RATCHET

For all of the Court’s talk of reasonableness and balancing, there
are also times when it continues to fall back onto rules and presumptions
as a way of limiting individual rights. That is, in cases where a reasonableness rule would actually benefit a criminal defendant, the Court is
often reluctant to engage in balancing and has tended to prefer stability
and predictability of rigid rules. This seemingly selective application of
an untethered reasonableness balancing calls out for doctrinal reform.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista.164 Atwater involved a civil action brought by Gail
Atwater against Lago Vista, Texas and police officer Bart Turek.165
Turek had arrested Atwater after he noticed her driving without a
163. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 862 n.356 (2004) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (“When the state of the law is unclear, law enforcement
officers are generally protected from civil suits by the doctrine of qualified immunity.”); Michael
N. Levy, The Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement Officers who Permit Camera Crews to
Film the Execution of a Warrant in a Private Home be Held Liable for Civil Damages?, 92 NW.
U. L. REV. 1153, 1172 (1998) (“Qualified immunity . . . protects officials if the law was not
clearly established or if it was objectively reasonable that the specific official did not know the
law in question was clearly established at the time of the incident in question.”).
164. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
165. Id. at 323–25.
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seatbelt on herself or her two young passengers.166 Although driving
without a seatbelt and failing to belt younger passengers was a misdemeanor punishable only with up to a $50 fine, Officer Turek arrested
Atwater and had her taken to the police station for booking, where she
spent about one hour in a jail cell before being taken before a magistrate
and released on $310 bond.167
Atwater subsequently sued the officer as well as the city and the
chief of police, arguing that it was unreasonable to arrest a citizen for an
offense for which she could not be jailed if convicted.168 After cataloguing hundreds of years of Anglo-American precedent and tradition, the
Court concluded that history weighed in favor of permitting full custodial arrest even for non-violent misdemeanors.169 The Court then turned
to Atwater’s next argument: “[W]hen historical practice fails to speak
conclusively to a Fourth Amendment claim, courts must strike a current
balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular
contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness.”170 The Court agreed that if it were merely engaging in balancing
the government interests here against the intrusion on the individual,
Atwater would prevail on her claim.171 However, the Court stated that it
has “traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in
the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.”172 The
Court opted for a simple approach: An arrest is valid if it is made on the
basis of probable cause to believe that an infraction had occurred. The
Court thus enforced the probable cause standard in a case where it was
clear that an analysis of the reasonableness of the official conduct would
cut against the government conduct.
The Court would take this argument to its logical, if extreme, conclusion in Virginia v. Moore,173 decided seven years later. In Moore, the
officer cited the defendant for driving with a suspended license and
arrested him.174 A search incident to that arrest revealed crack cocaine
166. Id. at 323–24.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 325.
169. Id. at 327–40.
170. Id. at 321.
171. Id. at 346–47 (“In her case, the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous
humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.
Atwater’s claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the
City can raise against it specific to her case.”).
172. Id. at 347.
173. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
174. Id. at 166–67.
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and a large amount of cash.175 It later became clear that under Virginia
law, the officer was not entitled to arrest Moore for this offense; the
code permitted only the issuance of a citation.176 While Texas law had
been silent on the question of whether Atwater should be cited or
arrested, Virginia law was clear: Moore should have been issued a citation and released.177 Furthermore, under the Court’s previous decision in
Knowles v. Iowa,178 an officer is not permitted to conduct a search incident to citation.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the incriminating
evidence obtained from Moore after his arrest was admissible in federal
court: “In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has
probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his
presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt.
The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.”179 The Court went on to say
that the decision was clearer in this case than it had been in Atwater:
“Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would
produce a constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the
one we rejected in Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as
easy to apply as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.”180 In other words, even when a state has prohibited arrest
for a particular infraction, such an arrest is constitutional under federal
law so long as it is supported by probable cause.
Perhaps the most important recent example of the Court preferring
fixed rules over general reasonableness assessments—such as assessment of whether the officer acted unreasonably under the circumstances—is Whren v. United States.181 In Whren, the Court refused to
prohibit racial profiling under the Fourth Amendment by rejecting a rule
that would have asked “whether a police officer, acting reasonably,
would have made the stop for the reason given.”182 In the case, the
officer, working drug interdiction in the middle of the night in an
unmarked police car, pulled over the defendant for making a right turn
without signaling.183 When the officer approached the car, he observed
what he believed to be crack cocaine in the defendant’s hands and
arrested him.184 The defendant argued that the traffic stop was pretextual
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 167.
Id.
Id. at 168.
525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998).
Moore, 553 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 175.
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Id. at 810.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 808–09.
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and that a reasonable officer would not have stopped him for such a
minor traffic infraction.185 Rejecting the defendant’s request for an
inquiry into whether a reasonable officer would have made the same
traffic stop, the Court wrote that “police enforcement practices, even if
they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place
and from time to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure
protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable . . . .”186 In other
words, the general reasonableness of the officer’s conduct is not at issue
when fixed, predictable rules like probable cause can be readily applied.
A final example will suffice, although others abound. In Oliver v.
United States,187 the Court was asked to consider an application of the
open fields doctrine. In Oliver, drug enforcement officials trespassed on
Oliver’s property, walking past “No Trespassing” signs and not leaving
when asked to do so by the property owner.188 They eventually found
marijuana growing more than a mile from Oliver’s house and charged
him with manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of federal
law.189 Although the officers were not armed with a warrant—or, presumably, probable cause—the Court upheld the search, holding that real
property outside the home and its curtilage is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.190 Because such property is not used for the intimate activities with which the home is associated, the Court reasoned, it is not
entitled to the protections of the home provided by the Amendment.191
The Court’s reasoning was both textual and practical. It cited the text of
the Amendment in concluding that open fields are not among the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” explicitly protected by the text of the
Fourth Amendment.192 And it reasoned that, as a practical matter, people
simply do not treat their open fields in a manner consistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy.193
Oliver countered that while the Court’s analysis of how people use
their open fields is generally correct, he should be permitted to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
185. Id. at 809.
186. Id. at 815.
187. 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984).
188. Id. at 173.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 176 (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)) (“[T]he special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and
effects’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law.”).
191. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
192. Id. at 176–77.
193. Id. at 179.
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searched by the trespassing officers.194 The Court rejected his argument
for case-by-case adjudication:
This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for
courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition
of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances. The ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the
policeman to discern the scope of his authority; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably
enforced.195

Again, the Court prioritized predictability above a balancing, case-bycase approach.
We have no quarrel with the Court’s concern in these cases for the
predictability that comes from hard and fast rules. There is no question
that rules, as opposed to standards, lend predictability to both law
enforcement officers and members of the public—that is, in fact, one of
the central theses of this Article. By contrast, focusing on reasonableness, subjective good faith, or other individualized and case-specific factors reduces clarity and adds uncertainty. But the Court’s approach to the
reasonableness standards in the Fourth Amendment context operates as a
one-way ratchet. When a criminal defendant seeks a hard and fast rule—
a warrant requirement, a requirement that officers obtain consent from a
person actually authorized to give it, a requirement that officers inform a
suspect of her right to refuse consent, et cetera—the Court repeatedly
opts for the flexibility of totality of the circumstances reasonableness
tests. When, by contrast, the defendant argues that the particularities of
his case should be taken into account, the Court almost inevitably finds
comfort in the stability and predictability of hard and fast rules.196
As we demonstrate in the next section, the Court’s reticence to find
in favor of criminal defendants might have been defensible at a time
when the exclusionary rule operated as a complete bar to the introduction of illegally seized evidence at a defendant’s criminal trial. The cost
of finding government conduct to violate the Constitution during this
period was extremely high and likely operated as a powerful deterrent to
the Court. Today, by contrast, exclusion does not follow logically from
194. Id. at 181.
195. Id. at 181–82 (internal citations omitted).
196. A good example of this is the search incident to arrest doctrine. The driving rationale for
the doctrine is the risk that a defendant will destroy evidence or access a weapon while he is being
arrested. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969). However, the Court has applied
these exigencies in a generalizing way such that the individual characteristics of the defendant—
how fast he is, for example—make no difference as to the scope of the permissible search.
Moreover, the search incident to arrest is often automatic, or close to it, even if there is no risk of
destruction or danger. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (recognizing officers’ right
to search for evidence of the crime of arrest without probable cause).
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every finding of a constitutional violation; instead, the Court has emphasized that it is the rare exception rather than the rule.197
2.

PATH DEPENDENCY: A FOURTH AMENDMENT BORN
ROBUST EXCLUSIONARY RULE

FROM A

The second and perhaps more salient doctrinal distortion relates to
the relatively recent diminution of the exclusionary rule. As explained
above, much of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine was born at a
time when the exclusionary remedy was virtually automatic. During this
period, Fourth Amendment doctrine was necessarily shaped by the certainty and severity of the exclusionary remedy. In a related context,
Anthony Amsterdam has described this effect by noting that when courts
regard the remedial medicine as too strong, they tend to prefer the disease.198 There is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court, in
developing the Fourth Amendment as we know it today, felt compelled
to dilute its doctrine in order to avoid the strong medicine of exclusion.
Moreover, a certain path-dependence characterizes the Court’s current
Fourth Amendment cases. The Fourth Amendment rules in place today
might not be the ones the Court would craft were it writing on a blank
slate; current doctrine is in many ways a vestige of a Court concerned
about the prospect of automatic exclusion.
Today’s Fourth Amendment, then, is the worst of both worlds—the
exclusionary remedy has been eviscerated but the right continues to be
applied as though a robust remedial framework were in place. We have a
substantive doctrine that has developed and continues to develop as
though there is an ever-present threat of exclusion and a remedial regime
that has evolved such that exclusion is now extremely unlikely. The
resulting double-reasonableness produces an unpredictable right and a
most unlikely remedy.
IV.

A WAY HOME: RETURNING FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
CLEAR RULES

TO

There is a solution to what we describe as an untenable status quo.
The current Fourth Amendment, as almost anyone who gives it a careful
read seems to agree, is in a state of embarrassing disarray.199 It neither
197. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (“[T]he benefits of deterrence must outweigh
the costs.”).
198. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV.
525, 543 (1975) (“[D]ismissal [with prejudice] as a remedy has the sole effect of making judges
almost universally prefer the disease.”).
199. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 13, at 383 (quoting Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610, 618 (1961)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In its fourth amendment jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court has struggled continually, and unsuccessfully, to develop a coherent
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protects individuals from intrusions by government actors nor gives
well-meaning government officials a sense of what conduct is permitted
and what conduct is not. In short, the Fourth Amendment, as imagined
by the current Supreme Court, is weak, unclear, and ineffective at vindicating rights. The right is opaque and the remedy essentially nonexistent.
But all is not lost. The Court’s move in Hudson v. Michigan toward
an exclusionary rule governed by balancing in every case has the unexpected advantage of lowering the cost of finding a constitutional violation.200 Exclusion is now only applied when it “pays its own way,” and
cases like Herring have focused the Court’s attention in this inquiry on
the culpability or malfeasance of the arresting officer. If his conduct is
not particularly egregious, then the balancing is unlikely to weigh in
favor of suppression.201 Accordingly, as cases like Davis demonstrate,
when the Court makes a novel rule of Fourth Amendment law, it will
refuse to exclude evidence both in the case creating the rule and in any
other case already under way. While this development has largely been
seen as a denial of the exclusionary rule’s promise, we see this new
remedial framework as providing the Court with an opportunity to go
back and revisit some of its most problematic substantive Fourth
Amendment decisions at a very low cost. The twin goals of clarity and
predictability are sufficiently important in the context of police searches
and seizures that the Court should take advantage of this opportunity.
Doing so involves two steps. First, it is essential that the Court
firmly embrace a merits-first order-of-decision-making in the exclusionary rule context. That is, in these cases the Supreme Court should
address the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim before turning to the
question of whether the evidence obtained may be used in the Government’s case in chief. In its exclusionary rule cases, the Court has
expressed agnosticism regarding whether the merits of a constitutional
question should be reached even when the Court ultimately concludes
that the exclusionary remedy is unavailable.202 In our view, consistent
doctrinal development requires a merits-first approach in most, if not all,
analytical framework. Indeed, the Court has admitted its fourth amendment shortcomings,
confessing that ‘[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not—to put it
mildly—run smooth[ly].’”); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in
Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 134 (1992) (“[T]he Supreme Court, in
its zeal to ensure efficient and effective government service delivery, has taken the Fourth
Amendment perilously close to incomprehensible disarray.”).
200. See Jeffries, supra note 157, at 106.
201. Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48.
202. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1987) (denying relief under the good faith
exception does not “preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure”); see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 849 (2005).
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criminal cases203 regardless of whether the suppression remedy is ultimately deemed inapplicable. That is to say, the doctrinal fog cannot be
lifted if the Court resolves the exclusionary question before the merits
question. Because exclusion is now a last resort, analyzing the remedial
entitlement first will end the Court’s inquiry in the vast majority of
cases.204 If the remedy is evaluated first, the Court will only very rarely
create any substantive law at all.
The need for merits-first adjudication has been urged in previous
scholarship, particularly in the context of constitutional tort litigation.205
The importance of avoiding constitutional stagnation by spurring constitutional merits decisions was explained by the Supreme Court in Saucier
v. Katz:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set
forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right
is clearly established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration
from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning
to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first
inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court
simply to skip ahead to the question whether [the remedy was
unavailable].206

In 2009 the Court moved away from mandating merits-first adjudication in civil rights litigation. It overruled Saucier in Pearson v. Callahan and returned the ordinal question to the lower courts.207 In doing so,
however, the Court actually made the case for imposing a merits-first
rule in criminal cases. It rationalized its reversal of Saucier in part by
noting that “constitutional issues” would not become frozen in time
because many of the same issues also arise in, among other contexts,
“criminal cases.”208 If this promise of alternate tracks for adjudicating
203. In cases where the constitutional claim is clearly frivolous or cannot be supported by the
facts in the record, a merits-first adjudication is unnecessary. See Sam Kamin, An Article III
Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of
Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV 53 (2008).
204. A rigid requirement of merits-first adjudication was rejected in the context of
constitutional tort litigation. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). But Pearson itself
references criminal cases as a viable, alternative forum for developing Fourth Amendment law. Id.
at 233. See also, e.g., Kamin, supra note 203, at 95; Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at
a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687 (2011).
205. We acknowledge that previous scholarship has found that merits-first adjudications do not
necessarily result in the creation of more, or more robust, rights. Nancy Leong, The Saucier
Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 671, 702–07
(2009). However, we think the need for clarity as to the right is of sufficient importance as to
justify such an approach in the realm of criminal cases.
206. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
207. 555 U.S. 223, 235.
208. Id. at 242.
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Fourth Amendment rights is to be real rather than hollow, federal courts
must adopt a merits-first order-of-decision-making in criminal cases.
In addition to adjudicating the merits even when a remedy may not
ultimately be available, the Court should take the relatively costless
opportunity to revisit existing doctrine. Presently, there are strands of
Fourth Amendment law that insist that the warrant and probable cause
presumptions continue to govern, others that treat reasonableness as the
paramount question, and still others that emphasize trespass as the quintessential Fourth Amendment question. Through a merits-first order-ofdecision-making combined with a relatively muted exclusionary rule,
the Court could effectively re-invent Fourth Amendment doctrine without requiring any current or previous convictions to be placed into
jeopardy.
One approach—the one we have hinted at throughout this Article—
would be for the Court to return to a reading of the Fourth Amendment
that resembles the one it used Katz v. United States and its immediate
progeny. In particular, the relaxing of the exclusionary rule is an opportunity for the Court to return to the clarity and simplicity of the warrant
and probable cause presumptions that governed Fourth Amendment
adjudication for much of the second half of the twentieth century. By
returning to these presumptions—by reinvigorating and clarifying the
substance of the Fourth Amendment—the Court would have a relatively
costless opportunity to return the Fourth Amendment to predictable, easily-applied rules, which would provide guidance to both law enforcement and citizens.
In this way the dizzying pattern of overlapping reasonableness
inquiries could be avoided. Reasonableness in the form of balancing
focused on the culpability of the officer will continue to govern the
question of remedy, but predictable rules predicated on the warrant and
probable cause presumptions would play a more central role in defining
the substance of the right. In a world of strong constitutional presumptions and an exclusionary rule focused on officer culpability, substantive
rules would develop and evolve while the short-term, immediate impact
on the criminal justice system would be minimal. Specifically, as the
Court reworks the Fourth Amendment, it will find new violations of the
Fourth Amendment; official conduct that was previously permitted will
now be prohibited. But in these cases, the evidence obtained would
likely not be excluded because the officers were not on notice that their
conduct violated the Constitution. Only later, once the fog had lifted and
the contours of the Fourth Amendment have become clear, would evidence be excluded. When the law is clear and officers violate it nonethe-
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less, they will trigger exclusion even under the Court’s current, cramped
interpretation of the exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Leon, the first chink in the exclusionary rule’s
once-impenetrable armor, Justice Brennan’s dissent contained a powerful warning to his brethren: “[T]he language of deterrence and of cost/
benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can have a narcotic effect. It
creates an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability.”209 If reasonableness and cost/benefit balancing has had a narcotic effect on the
Court, then this Article serves as the Court’s intervention. The narcotic
effect of reasonableness balancing has caused the Court to turn its back
on many of its core Fourth Amendment principles. We encourage the
Court to take the opportunity presented by its current remedial framework to return to a more grounded, predictable, and rule-based conception of the substance of Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court has previously articulated predictability and clarity as
important principles in the search and seizure context. The limited scope
of the exclusionary rule now provides the Court with an opportunity and
an incentive to reintegrate these concepts into substantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine at zero cost to current and pending convictions.
Doctrinal stagnation is avoided but convictions are not jeopardized. Our
approach makes a virtue of a vice: It takes the potentially devastating
diminution in the power of the exclusionary rule and turns it into an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to fix what nearly everyone agrees is
broken.

209. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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